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I. INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the nineteenth century investors from the
United States and Western Europe were attracted to the undeveloped
resources and markets of Latin America.' However, investing experience
with unstable Latin American governments soon led to conservative in-
vestment tactics, with agriculture and the extractive industries becoming
the focal point of foreign investment.' After World War II there were two
major shifts in investment policy. Initially there was a focus shift to manu-
facturing,3 and secondly, as European investors turned their capital and
energies to the task of rebuilding their war-ravaged continent, direct capi-
tal investment by enterprises controlled by the United States increased
dramatically.'
The 1960's were to have been years of rapid development and growth in
Latin America.5 The Alliance for Progress 6 was based upon the notion that
growth in Latin America could best be obtained by the encouragement of
direct foreign investment to supplement local capital resources.7 During
this same period the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
was formed to increase uniformly regional trade throughout Latin America
by the reduction and elimination of intraregional trade barriers However,
LAFTA's failure to provide economic planning for coordinated distribution
of direct foreign investment, promoted by the Alliance for Progress, re-
* The author wishes to express his gratitude for the substantial research assistance pro-
vided by David Roman.
I Jova, "Private Investment in Latin America," 10 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 455, 460 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Jova].
2 Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
From 1946 to 1959, investment in United States-controlled enterprises abroad increased
value from $7.2 billion to $29.7 billion, and of this increase over $6.0 billion, or almost 27%,
flowed to Latin America. Id. at 462.
Berhaman, Promotion of Private Overseas Investment, in U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT
INVESTMENT ABROAD 165 (R. Mikesell ed. 1962).
1 OAS, Alliance For Progress. Official Documents Emanating from the Special Meeting of
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial Level, Punta del Este,
Aug. 5-17, 1961 OAS/Ser.H/X.1, Doc. 145 (Aug. 16, 1971). See H. PERLOFF, ALLIANCE FOR
PROGRESS (1969).
1 The policy behind such a notion was the expectation that private investment could help
Latin American countries achieve higher standards of living, thereby undermining the appeal
of the more radical nationalists, without incurring the political risks or social turbulence
which foreign aid assistance might engender. Jova, supra note 1, at 463.
1 Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin America Free Trade
Association, signed Feb. 18, 1960, OAS Doc. Ser. H/V ES-18/60, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, I MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN LATIN
AMERICA 57 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Montevideo].
I Id. art. 2.
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suited in the gravitation of those funds towards the more developed Latin
American nations.'" Thus, under LAFTA, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
widened their existing lead over the smaller nations of Latin America in
the area of industrial development."
The bellicose and restrictive attitude of Latin American nations toward
foreign investment began with a rejection of their "dependency" upon the
technologically advanced investing nations.. The proponents of this
"dependency theory"'" argue that foreign investors usually displace na-
tional investors in manufacturing and other important economic sectors.,'
"Dependency" theorists also contend that foreign investors have the ad-
vantage when bargaining with host countries, since they are usually free
to relocate their enterprises (with its concomitant employment capacity)
should they become dissatisfied with the "investment climate" in a partic-
ular host country, resulting in excessive concessions being made by the
host country. 5 Therefore, the "dependency" theorists concluded that
Latin American nations realized that their goal of development could not
be adequately met until this antidevelopmental effect was neutralized.
This could be accomplished by a coordination of development goals and
foreign investment, which will occur when local interests enjoy greater
participation in and control over foreign enterprises.'"
Others argue it was the success, not the failure (as the dependency
theorists argue), of past patterns of foreign investment that has given rise
to the restrictive policy of Latin American nations toward foreign invest-
ment. 7 It is contended that industrial and social progress, due in large
measure to past patterns of foreign investment, has given Latin Americans
the technical knowledge and industrial power to demand that attention be
paid to their developmental priorities.
Regardless of its validity, the "dependency theory" has had a substan-
tial effect upon the recent policies of the less developed Latin American
nations with respect to foreign investment." While under LAFTA, Argen-
" Note, Political Components and Practical Effects of the Andean Foreign Investment
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, AFIC].
Id. at 1599.
' Jova, supra note 1, at 469-70.
' Id. at 470-73. Latin America's ultimate goal, according to the theory, is to improve the
standard of living and social well-being of its people through industrialization. But this goal
must be achieved in such a way that the standard of living is raised for substantial segments
of the population. Income distribution is to be as broad as possible and their economies are
to achieve sufficient strength to allow them to compete fully on their own as exporters of
manufactured goods. Until then, they will be "dependent" on economic forces outside their
control. Id. at 471.
1 Id.
'5 Id. at 472.
" Id. at 473.
'7 Id. at 456.
" Id.
g Id. at 473-76. Perhaps the most fundamental change has been the shift from a passive
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tina, Brazil and Mexico increased intraregional exports, the less developed
nations saw their intraregional trade deficit triple, 0 creating a fear of grow-
ing dependency not only upon the United States and Western Europe, but
also upon the more developed nations in Latin America."' It was this fear
that led the less developed Andean countries of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru (later joined by Venezuela) to form the subregional
Andean Common Market (ANCOM). 2
H. THE ANDEAN COMMON MARKET (ANCOM)
Established by the Agreement of Cartagena,13 ANCOM was created with
the approval of LAFTA to function as an entity within the free trade area.24
There are, however, important differences between ANCOM and LAFTA.
While LAFTA focused on a policy of trade liberalization under which
participating countries exchange tariff concessions, 2 ANCOM focuses on
regional development-planning within a common market framework. 26 The
nations participating in ANCOM have an obligation to automatically
eliminate barriers to trade among themselves by the end of 198027 and to
create a common external tariff by the end of 1980.21 The major legal
barrier 9 to the formation of ANCOM was removed when LAFTA agreed
to permit subregional tariff reduction agreements among LAFTA's mem-
bers.30 It was decided that there was no obligation under LAFTA to extend
the benefits of subregional tariff reductions to countries not parties to the
subregional agreement, despite LAFTA's most-favored-nation policy. 3'
The Cartagena Agreement established a Commission and a Board as the
principal organs of ANCOM.3S The Commission is composed of representa-
to an active posture at the investment banking table. No longer merely concerned to ensure
national sovereignty, protect the national patrimony and prevent flagrant abuses, Latin
American leaders are confronting potential investors with an expanding notion of exactly how
foreign private capital should fit into national development plans and contribute toward their
realization. Id. at 473.
20 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1598-99.
21 Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 6
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Valdez].
22 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1599.
23 Agreement of Cartagena, May 26, 1969, in force Oct. 16, 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L L.
MAT'LS 910 (Sept. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Agreement of Cartagena].
21 Lisocki, The Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 317, 318 (1973-1974)
[hereinafter cited as Lisocki].
11 Id. at 318.
21 Id. at 319.
"7 Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 23, at 921, art. 45.
21 Id. at 926, art. 61.
" Treaty of Montevideo, supra note 8, art. 1. The stumbling block to any subregional
agreement among LAFTA's members was the Treaty's ban on subregional tariff reduction
agreements in article 1.
3 Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 HOUSTON L. Rzv. 487, 491 (1970-71).
31 Id.
32 Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 23, at 911-15, arts. 5-18.
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tives from each member country, 33 and the Board, which is the secretariat
of ANCOM, is headed by three individuals unanimously selected by the
Commission.3 1 The Board is to represent the general community interest
and must make its decisions unanimously.35 By contrast the Commission
may, in most cases, act by a two-thirds vote of its members.:
III. ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE
A. Classification of Enterprises
Decision 24 of the Commission, which establishes the Andean Foreign
Investment Code,3" adheres to the view that a common policy toward for-
eign investments is a prerequisite to successful economic integration . 3
Article 1 of the Code establishes three categories of business enterprises
which serve as the basis of a complex system of privileges and protections
to be applied to each of the different types of business enterprise.3 9 The
three categories are: (1) the "national enterprise" in which more than 80
percent of the capital and management control' belongs to "national
investors;"'" (2) the "mixed enterprise," in which national investors con-
trol from 51 percent to 80 percent of the enterprise's capital and manage-
ment"2 and (3) the "foreign enterprise" in which national investors own
less than 51 percent of the capital. 3
B. Registration
Article 2 of the Code requires foreign investors who wish to invest in one
of the member countries to submit an application to the "competent na-
tional authority"" of the prospective host country and to obtain from that
3 Id. at 911, art. 6.
.1 Id. at 913, arts. 3, 13.
Id. at 915, art. 17.
31 Id. at 912, art. 11.
17 Andean Foreign Investment Code, preamble, effective June 30, 1971, reprinted in 11
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126 (1972), as amended (July 17, 1971).
3 See M. WIONCZEK, LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1966).
11 Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 129.
4I Id.
1, National investors are defined as the State, national individuals and enterprises and
foreign nationals with at least one year consecutive residence in the host country who re-
nounce their right of transfer abroad. Id. at 128, art. 1.
11 Id. at 129. In addition, article 1 provides that a mixed enterprise shall be considered
Foreign if national investors exercise less than 51 percent management control, irrespective
of the capital ownership.
"1 Id. A firm may be classified as mixed, despite foreign ownership of over 50 percent, only
if (a) the State or a State enterprise is the minority owner, and (b) if the State, despite
minority ownership, has a determining voice in the management of the firm. Id. at 138, art.
36.
" The "competent national authority" will be a designated agency of each member gov-
ernment. Valdez, supra note 21, at 7 n.35.
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authority an authorization to invest. 5 In evaluating the application, the
competent national authority must consider whether the proposed invest-
ment corresponds to the development priorities of the recipient nation. 6
Under article 3, the national authority is directed to refrain from authoriz-
ing foreign investment in areas of the economy which it thinks are already
adequately covered by existing business enterprises. 7 Furthermore, a for-
eign investment is not jo be authorized if the purpose of that investment
is to acquire shares in an existing national enterprise, unless the competent
national authority certifies that the investment is the only means of pre-
venting the bankruptcy of the national enterprise, and that national and
subregional investors were given the first opportunity to acquire equity in
the enterprise."
The registration and authorization requirements of the Code not only
restrict foreign investment in local enterprises, 9 but by favoring local en-
terprises tend to insure that ownership, once acquired by nationals, will
remain in the hands of national or subregional investors. Another impor-
tant facet of these requirements is the discretion given to the competent
national authority of each country. However, this broad discretion to inter-
pret the Code's requirements seems contrary to the expressed goal of arriv-
ing at a uniform policy on incentives and controls for foreign investment. 0
C. Transformation to Local Control
One of the most controversial aspects of the Code is the attempt to
encourage transformation of foreign enterprises into either mixed or na-
tional enterprises."1 Article 27 limits the advantages of duty-free trade in
ANCOM to products produced by national enterprises, mixed enterprises,
and foreign enterprises in the process of being transformed into national
or mixed enterprises pursuant to the provisions of the Code.2
Article 28 allows foreign enterprises existing as of June 30, 1971, three
years to sign an agreement of transformation pursuant to article 31 with
the competent national authority of the host country.5 3 At the end of the
three year period, regardless of whether gradual transformation to local
control was opted for, national investors have to own at least 15 percent of
11 Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 129, art. 2.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 129, art. 3.
I d.
Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 129.
50 Valdez, supra note 21, at 8. Under the Code, Bolivia, for example, may find that 100
textile mills are insufficient, while Colombia may find four to be too many. The results of
such decisions may be to make the Code substantially ineffective, unless and until specific
and binding guidelines controlling the interpretation of key code provisions are established
by the Commission.
Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1602-04.
5 Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 135, art. 27.
Id. at 135-36. art. 28.
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the capital of the enterprise."4 The transformation of the enterprise to
mixed or national status must be carried out within 15 years of the date
the Code became effective (June 30, 1971) in Colombia, Chile and Peru,
and within 20 years after the date in Bolivia and Ecuador.5 Upon expira-
tion of two-thirds of the period for transformation, national investors must
own at least 45 percent of the capital of the enterprise."
Under the provisions of article 30, foreign enterprises organized in the
ANCOM member countries after the effective date of the Code will not be
given an option in the matter of transformation. Eventual transformation
to mixed ownership is mandatory, but ownership by subregional investors
and the Andean Development Corporation,57 the subregional development
bank owned by the member countries of ANCOM, is counted as national
ownership.-" The transformation to mixed enterprise status must be com-
pleted within 15 years after production begins if the new enterprise is
located in Colombia, Chile and Peru,59 and there must be at least 15 per-
cent national ownership at the time production begins.60 Furthermore, at
the end of one-third of the agreed transformation period, there must be at
least 30 percent national ownership, 1 and at least 45 percent national
ownership at the end of two-thirds of the agreed period."
New enterprises in Bolivia and Ecuador are given three years after pro-
duction begins to achieve five percent national ownership,63 and are given
22 years after production begins to transform to 51 percent national owner-
ship. 4 In these two countries, at the end of one-third of the agreed period
for transformation there must be 10 percent national ownership " and at
least 35 percent national ownership upon completion of two-thirds of that
period. 6 The more lenient provisions for the transformation of enterprises
located in Ecuador and Bolivia are designed to help these less developed
countries attract investors. 7
54 Id.
5 Id.
r Id.
17 Agreement Establishing the Andean Development Corporation, signed Feb. 7, 1968,
reprinted in 8 I1T'L LEGAL MAT'I 940 (1969).
Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 136-37, art. 30. Decision 47, approved
by the Commission in 1972, would allow an enterprise with as much as 70 percent foreign
ownership to avoid transformation and still qualify for tariff privileges if at least 30 percent
of its equity is owned by the host country and if the government maintains controls over
decisions of the enterprise. See Fouts, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10 TEXAS INT'L
L. J. 537, 557 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fouts].
11 Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 136-37, art. 30.
'Id.
1 Id.
62 Id.
"Id.
'4 Id.
6Id.
fi Id.
67 Fouts, supra note 58, at 540.
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Several economic sectors are accorded special treatment under the
transformation provisions of the Code. Article 38 allows each member
country to reserve sectors of economic activity for national enterprises."
Article 40 exempts foreign enterprises operating in the basic products sec-
tor (the exploitation of minerals and forests) from the requirement of trans-
formation during the first 10 years of the Code 9 and provides that such
foreign enterprises may enter the subregion under concession contracts if
the duration of each concession contract is no longer than 20 years. 0 This
exemption appears to be a special grant to the largest and most profitable
sector of the Andean economy.7"
Article 41 provides that neither the establishment of foreign enterprises
nor new foreign investment will be permitted in the public services sector,
i.e., telecommunications, water, and electric power.7" Under the provisions
of article 42, no new foreign investment is to be permitted in the financial
sector, i.e., banking and insurance." Existing foreign banking enterprises
are given three years after the effective date of the Code to become national
enterprises, and if they did not choose to do so, they are not permitted to
accept local deposits after the end of that three year period." Similar
restrictions are placed upon foreign-owned domestic transportation enter-
prises, advertising enterprises, television and radio stations, magazines
and newspapers.7 5
Article 44 allows the member countries to abrogate the restrictions in
articles 41 through 43.1 This escape clause adds needed flexibility in the
event that local technological and managerial skills prove insufficient to
effectively operate a restricted sector of the economy. There is, however,
a danger that this provision will be used to treat foreign investors more
favorably in one country than in others.77
Although the transformation requirement of the Code is a useful tool for
putting control of local industry into the hands of local investors (and
certainly more palatable to foreign investors than expropriation), there are
problems with the approach. First, there is some doubt about the ability
of local investors to supply the tremendous amounts of capital needed to
acquire the equity to transform investments into national and mixed enter-
prises." The Code offers no constructive solution to the problem presented
Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 138, art. 38.
Id. at 138-39, art. 40.
70 Id.
7' Valdez, supra note 21, at 10.
72 Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 139, art. 41.
11 Id. at 139, art. 42.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 139-40, art. 43.
11 Id. at 140, art. 44.
7 Valdez, supra note 21, at 10-11.
71 Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investments, 5
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 329 (1971-72) [hereinafter cited as Furnish].
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if a firm cannot sell the requisite shares to accomplish transformation
within the agreed period."There are also loopholes in the transformation
provisions. Article 34, for example, exempts foreign enterprises from all
transformation requirements if they export more than 80 percent of their
output to non-Andean countries. 0 Here, as in the exemption for enterprises
operating in the basic products sector, there appears to be a special conces-
sion to a large and profitable sector of the Andean economy."
D. The Reinvestment and Repatriation of Capital
The reinvestment and repatriation of captial are restricted under article
37, which limits the annual profit from the ANCOM nations to 14 percent
of the value of the foreign enterprise, all of which may be repatriated to
the home company.2 Foreign enterprises wishing to reinvest any portion
of their profits are subject to article 12 which provides that reinvestment
of these profits is to be considered foreign investment. 3 Thus, article 13
requires registration and authorization of all reinvested annual profits in
excess of five percent of the enterprise's capital base."4
The provisions concerning reinvestment and repatriation of capital raise
several unanswered questions with the result that each member country
of ANCOM has a great deal of discretion. First it is not known whether
the 14 percent repatriation limit and the five percent reinvestment limit
are to be applied to profits before or after tax is withheld.15 Furthermore,
it is not yet known whether the reinvestment of profit will be allowed to
increase the capital base of an enterprise for the purpose of computing
reinvestment and repatriation limits. 6 If reinvestment is allowed to in-
crease the capital base of an enterprise, the problem of transformation is
aggravated because local investors must produce the capital needed to
acquire 51 percent of an enterprise that grows at the rate of five percent
(or more if greater reinvestment is authorized by the host country) each
year. As already noted, the Code provides no solution to the problem
created if local investors fail to produce the needed capital. 7 Finally, the
79 Id.
Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 137, art. 34.
' Valdez, supra note 21, at 9.
Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 138, art. 37. The figure of 14 percent
return should not be a disincentive to invest in Latin America. 14.1 percent is the highest
profit being made by United States investors in any part of the world except for returns of
28.7 percent in theMiddle and Far East. Further, in applying the Code, Ecuador specifically
excepted the basic products, i.e., petroleum and other minerals and forest exploitation, from
the 14 percent limitation, citing article 40. Furnish, supra note 78, at 331 n.81.
Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 132, art. 12.
11 Id. art. 13. The process of authorization and registration is determined by each country's
competent national authority. See note 44 supra.
11 Council of the Americas, The Andean Pact 95 (Nov. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Council
of the Americas].
Id. at 94.
See note 78 supra.
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Code does not specify what is to be done with profits which cannot be
reinvested or transferred from the subregion. 8 Thus, in the areas of rein-
vestment and transfer of profits, the Code leaves open many basic ques-
tions which must be answered by each member of ANCOM. This creates
an opportunity for each country to make itself more attractive to foreign
investors than the other ANCOM members.8 9
Harsh restrictions are placed on the use of domestic credit by foreign
investors in article 17.10 Foreign enterprises will have access only to short-
term domestic credit, and then only in accordance with the terms specified
in regulations set forth by the Commission." Article 14 requires enterprises
to obtain the authorization of the competent national authority prior to
contracting for foreign credit.2
In an effort to prevent excessive transfers of profit under the guise of
interest payments on intercompany debt, article 16 states that the annual
interest payments on such loans "may not exceed by more than three
points the rate of interest of first class securities prevailing in the financial
market of the country of origin of the currency in which the transaction is
registered. ' '9 3 In addition, article 20 prohibits member countries from au-
thorizing contracts for the transfer of technology which would have the
effect of allowing excessive transfers of profit from member countries. 4
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
To gain a better understanding of the impact which the Code has had
on foreign investment in ANCOM, an examination of its legal status in
each of the member countries is necessary, especially in view of the broad
discretion given to the member countries.
Since the members are granted distinct advantages under the Code,9"
one might expect them to be leaders in its implementation; however, this
has not been the case.9 The Ecuadorean Government merely incorporated
the Code into its national law utilizing the escape clause of article 44 to
" Council of the Americas, supra note 85, at 95.
- See C. Z. Florez, ANCOM-A Peruvian Viewpoint, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 35 (July-
Aug. 1971).
- Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 132, art. 17.
I d.
92 Id. art. 14; see note 44 supra.
'. Id. art. 16.
' Id. at 133, art. 20. As where contracts between the foreign parent corporation and the
domestic subsidiary contain clauses which require the subsidiary to purchase from the parent
capital goods, intermediate products or raw materials used in the application of the technol-
ogy, being sold by the parent to the subsidiary at prices which are artifically high.
11 Fouts, supra note 58, at 540. Articles 28 and 30 specify the time limits in which foreign
investors must transfer a majority of the shares of their enterprises to national investors.
Under these articles, Bolivia and Ecuador are given longer periods for the transformation to
be consummated in recognition of their special status as the least-industrialized members of
ANCOM.
11 Id. at 540-43.
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abrogate the restrictions placed on various sectors of the economy (primar-
ily the financial and public service sectors) by articles 41 through 43 of the
Code." The Bolivian Government enacted the Code with the various ex-
ceptions allowed under article 44, and also indicated that it would not force
new enterprises producing only for the Bolivian market to transform to 15
percent national ownership."8 Even a strict implementation of the Code in
Bolivia would have little effect on foreign investment because most Boliv-
ian industries are extractive in nature and would be exempted from the
provisions of the Code."
In Colombia, the Code was made a part of national law by presidential
decree'" on the theory that approval by the Colombian Congress of its
entry into LAFTA vested in the President the power to approve participa-
tion in subgroups of LAFTA.' °' A court action' 2 was brought challenging
the constitutionality of the presidential decree in the absence of explicit
legislative ratification. The Supreme Court on January 20, 1972, recog-
nized the power of the President to implement international agreements
by executive agreements, but held that the Code was a matter of domestic
concern requiring legislative approval.'"3
To assure Colombian compliance with the Code until it could be ratified
by Congress, President Pastrana by decree brought Colombia's require-
ments for the registration of foreign investments into substantial conform-
ity with the Code.' 4 On March 21, 1973, the Congress approved Colombia's
entry into ANCOM,'0 5 and also gave President Pastrana the authority to
enact by presidential decree any of the decisions (resolutions) adopted by
the ANCOM Commission.' Soon afterward, the President incorporated
the Code into national law,'10 with banks and companies engaged in the
extractive industries being exempted from the Code's restrictions.'"
In contrast with Colombia's efforts to accomodate the Code, the military
government which replaced the Allende Government in Chile has tried to
"1 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1612 n.73.
"1 Id. at. 1612 n.74; Fouts, supra note 58, at 541.
n Fouts, supra note 58, at 542.
11 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1613. Colombia's President Pastrana chose to promulgate
the Code by issuing Decree Law 1299, on June 30, 1971, followed on November 4, 1971 by a
regulatory law known as Decree Law 2153.
"I Id. at 1613-14. See Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin American Foreign Invest-
ment Laws, 7 INT'L LAw. 357, 371 (1973).
,02 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1614 n.80 and accompanying text.
' Id. at 1614 n.82. See Andean Pact Constitutionality: A Final World From Colombia, 7
LAWYER OF THE AMERCAS 614 (1975).
1*1 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1614. This action was pursuant to his authority under the
1967 exchange control laws: Decree Law 444 and its companion statute 688. Id. at 1614 n.84
and accompanying text.
1 Id. at 1614-15. Congress passed Law 8, ratifying Colombia's adherence to ANCOM.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1615 n.89 Decree Law 1900.
200 Id. at 1615 n.90.
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escape the Code's restrictions on foreign investments. The military govern-
ment sees the Code, which was adopted by the Allende Government, as
an obstacle to its all-out effort to attract new foreign investment."' In 1974
Chile passed a new national foreign investment law."' The other members
of ANCOM saw this national legislation as an effort to ignore the Code's
restrictions and passed a resolution declaring it to be a violation of the
Code."' In response, Chile quickly assured the other members of ANCOM
that it would enforce the Code as adopted despite its displeasure with
many of the terms imposed upon foreign investors by the Code." 3 There-
after, it became apparent that Chile would lobby for modifications in the
Code."
In Peru, the Code's prediliction for state participation and industrial
planning were not unfamiliar since those features were reflected in the
Peruvian General Law on Industries ' 5 already in effect."' Although the
Peruvian Government utilized the escape clause of article 44, it enacted
national regulations which were much more demanding upon the sectors
involved than the Code would have been."' For example, foreign owned
banks were given a 60 day period, rather than the three year period speci-
fied by the Code, to transform their capital structure to 80 percent Peru-
vian ownership."' Peru went beyond mere adherence to the Code by estab-
lishing the mechanism by which transformation of foreign firms to national
ownership is to be accomplished."' Industrial communities (employee or-
ganizations) were to be formed by each firm to receive 15 percent of its
'0 Fouts, supra note 58 at 547. The Code was ratified by Chile by Decree Law 482, issued
on June 30, 1971.
,, Id. at 548.
Id. On July 13, 1974, the Chilean Government issued a new national foreign investment
law, Decree Law 600, which required all new foreign investors to negotiate contracts with the
government. The Decree made no mention of the Code and thus left some doubt as to the
Code's validity in Chile.
"I Id. at 548-49. Comision del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Decimoguinto Periodo de Sesiones
Ordinarias, 10 a 14 y 19 a 20 de Septiembre, 1974-Acta Final.
,,3 Id. At the November 1974 meeting of ANCOM commissioners, the Chilean Government
representative announced that his government had issued Decree Number 746 which speci-
fically recognized that the Code was in effect in Chile and designated the governmental
agency established to administer Decree 600 as the competent national body charged with
applying the Code in Chile.
'" Id. At the same November meeting, see note 113 supra, the Chilean Government sig-
naled its continued displeasure with the terms of the Code, particularly the 14 percent of
investment value limitation on profits and indicated that it would continue to lobby for
changes in the Code.
1 The General Law on Industries, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1225 (1970).
"'Id. at 549-50.
" Fouts, supra note 58, at 551-54.
's Id. at 552.
"' Id. at 551. Decree Law 18999 established that transfer of shares to the enterprise's
industrial community, i.e., a cooperative formed by all the workers in an industrial facility,
was the principal mechanism by which national ownership was to be accomplished.
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annual net pretax income to be used by the community to buy into the
firm.' 20 The shares of a firm may also be transferred to its industrial com-
munity under an agreement that dividends from the shares transferred will
be used to amortize the purchase price of the shares. 2' Although Peru's
plan for transformation may be regarded as harsh, it has the advantage of
being definite, which gives rise to a consistent policy.
When Venezuela finally ratified the Code in 1973,122 most observers felt
that private sector opposition to the Code would lead to a liberal interpre-
tation of the Code and to full use of the escape clause in article 44.1
23
However, the Venezuelan economy radically changed during the period it
was formulating their policy for application of the Code. World oil prices
quadrupled, placing Venezuela in a position of wealth, and creating a
freedom to take the "hard line" approach to foreign investment which
results from rigid adherence to the provisions of the Code. 24 Perhaps the
key factor in the decision to implement the Code strictly was that the
acquisition of stock in foreign firms was seen as a place for Venezuela to
store its oil wealth.'25 To date, however, there has been no program for
government financing of the acquisition of stock in foreign firms.
2 6
It is still too early to assess the total impact the Code has had upon
foreign investment in the ANCOM countries. There was harsh criticism at
first, and opponents in the private sector still see the Code as an unneces-
sary restriction on foreign investment.17 A parent corporation which knows
that it will soon become a minority partner, it is argued, is not likely to
supply advanced technology to a future competitor.'2 The trend however,
appears to be toward the acceptance of the restrictions of the Code.'29
Although investors in the United States have been slower to accept these
restrictions than investors in Japan and Western Europe,1'3 it is highly
unlikely that businessmen in the United States will surrender their leader-
ship in a market of more than 46 million people.'
3
'
V. CONCLUSION
The common regional policy on foreign investment called for in the
Cartagena Agreement has not materialized, because each member country
12 Id.M21 Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1616-17 n.95.
11 Fouts, supra note 58, at 554. This was accomplished by Venezuelan Law 26 of that date,
effective January 1, 1974, passed September 3, 1973.
I" Id. at 550.
124 Id.
"' Id. at 555.
126 Id.
1' Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1618.
12' Lisocki, supra note 24, at 330.
in Note, AFIC, supra note 10, at 1618-22.
I3 Id.
"I' Id. at 1620.
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of ANCOM applies the Code with an eye toward securing its maximum
national advantage. 3" Some have given the Code a liberal interpretation
to gain an advantage in attracting foreign investment. 3 3 Others have taken
the "hard line" approach to absorb natural resource-generated wealth and
to gain the respect of underdeveloped nations throughout the world. 34
Nevertheless, the Code is seen as a binding international commitment, and
every member of ANCOM has recognized its duty to make national prac-
tices with respect to foreign investment conform to the basic principles set
forth in the Code. Even Chile, which now views the Code as a serious
obstacle to its efforts to attract foreign investors, has made its national
laws on foreign investment conform to the Code. 35 Worldwide economic
conditions are quite different today from those existing at the time the
Code was drafted. The 14 percent across-the-board ceiling on profit remit-
tances, reasonable in 1969, is perhaps unrealistic today. If the members of
ANCOM want to attract foreign investment they should remember that
investors must be given incentives to enter the area. Fair treatment, politi-
cal stability, and a chance to realize a fair return on capital investment
are incentives that can overcome the various restrictions imposed by the
Code. The willingness and ability of the members of ANCOM to offer such
incentives will determine its success.
Lloyd Pike
' Andean Foreign Investment Code, supra note 37, at 129, art. 2.
'3 Fouts, supra note 58, at 543-49. These include Colombia and Chile.
'13 Id. at 549-56. These are Peru and Venezuela.
11 See note 113 supra.
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